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Internet polls are becoming nowadays more and more important as they are being used on a large scale.
Their security aspects are probably the most signiﬁcant and hardest issue to be solved when we consider
web surveys. In this paper we present an innovative solution which considerably increases the security of
Internet polls and the reliability of their results by discriminating between human-cast and machine-cast
votes. We deﬁne the basic idea of the method used to achieve our goal, its security properties and the
testing results on a working prototype. In order to better test the performance and the eﬀective robustness
of the solution from the security point of view, we also propose a public challenge.
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1 Introduction
Online polls can be deﬁned as online surveys of public (or a sample of public) opinion
to acquire information about a speciﬁc topic. Being a web application, a poll can
suﬀer from a variety of attacks typical of this kind of programs. In particular, the
most relevant one has to be considered the explicit alteration of poll results by
means of automatic voting programs (bots), which act like human users in order to
vote repeatedly.
There are many examples where the results of some polls were dramatically
inﬂuenced by bots that were able to vote for a big number of times although security
measures were taken, like the famous episode involving a Slashdot Internet poll
about the best American graduate school in computer science [4].
Several factors make this security issue particularly complex to solve: the multi-
tude of browsers used, inconveniences to distribute certiﬁcates or secrets like user-
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names and passwords, the fact that users connect from diﬀerent workstations, usu-
ally behind ﬁrewalls, proxies and address translation boxes. Moreover, the struc-
ture of a typical web application easily allows computer programs to imitate human
behavior, permitting them to iteratively cast votes in order to obtain arbitrary
modiﬁcations of the ﬁnal results.
In this paper we present an innovative solution to solve the massive automated
voting problem which does not require any user registration or authentication and is
able to accept votes from computers connected to Internet with the same IP address.
Then, we discuss about the advantages of using the security method that we have
developed and we show some test results obtained from a working prototype which
implements our idea. Finally, we invite Internet users to ﬁnd weaknesses in the
proposed method by undertaking an open challenge.
2 Related work
According to [3], currently there are three diﬀerent categories of protection tech-
niques which can oﬀer some level of security to a poll system, preventing multiple
and automated voting. However, their eﬀectiveness cannot be considered high and,
from a security perspective, they can be classiﬁed as medium or weak methods.
The simplest way to protect a poll from automated scripts is the cookie-based
scheme. I works by setting a cookie containing the poll ID on the client, after a
user has correctly voted. This cookie is then sent in each HTTP call to the voting
script, thus stopping from being accepted subsequent voting requests from the same
client. The main issue with this method is the possibility to delete the cookie before
voting again, therefore allowing multiple voting.
A very widespread protection method is the IP locking scheme, which uses the
IP address of voters to discriminate among diﬀerent voting sessions. That is, the
IP address of voters is stored on the server after the ﬁrst vote and subsequent
attempts of voting from the same address are considered invalid. This approach
guarantees a high level of security, since IP address spooﬁng is generally considered
impossible on Internet. However it also prevents from voting potentially allowed
voters, like users who use the same proxy server or NAT box to connect to Internet,
those who share multi-user workstations or are connected through a dynamically
assigned IP address. Therefore, the IP locking method cannot be considered a
suitable protection scheme for Internet polls, since it excludes a considerably large
number of potential voters.
A further approach to poll security is based on CAPTCHA 3 and relies on in-
ability of computers in recognizing textual contents embedded inside pictures, char-
acterized by low quality and quite strong degradation. These images are generally
easily readable for human beings, but their content is usually illegible even to the
best OCR softwares [8].
3 Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell Computers and Humans Apart, also known as reverse
Turing test. Unlikely the traditional Turing test [13], the problem is not proving that one is a human to
another human, rather a computer has to decide whether one is human or not. See [4] for a more detailed
explanation and examples.
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Many diﬀerent types of CAPTCHAs have been proposed [1], based on hard-to-
solve Artiﬁcial Intelligence problems: some exploit computer programs inability to
read extremely distorted and corrupted text; some work by asking the user to solve
a visual pattern recognition problem, while others are based on machines diﬃculties
of understanding spoken language or concepts expressed by images.
Currently, there are two ways of using a CAPTCHA to protect the access to a
poll: one requires the user to pass the test before obtaining the poll’s main page [2].
However, this approach is not considered suitable for general applications, since it
does not allow the poll page to be directly inserted inside a portal or a web site.
The second application of CAPTCHAs to the poll context is known as order-
based method [3]. The main idea behind this protection scheme is to insert each
of the poll voting options into a runtime-generated and heavily degraded image, in
diﬀerent rows. The order-based method posses a higher level of security compared
to the cookie-based method and it is less restrictive than the IP locking scheme,
since every user is allowed to vote. However, security weaknesses has been found in
textual CAPTCHAs [5,6,11,12] and it is possible to bypass the protection scheme
only by focusing on the diﬀerent length of choice strings, rather than extracting the
full text from the image.
All the above considerations clearly show that currently there is no protection
scheme which can be considered both highly secure and fair enough to let all the
potential voters express their personal opinions about a speciﬁc topic.
3 Avoiding automatic voting
The main problem in CAPTCHA-based protection schemes has been shown to be
the type of test used, which cannot be considered anymore completely eﬀective to
tell humans and computers apart. Due to this reason, we devised a new technique
for preventing alteration of Internet polls results which is based on the human
ability to recognize a generic object displayed by a picture never seen before. Using
a test based on this ability, we can discriminate between humans and computers,
thus preventing automated programs to arbitrarily modify the distribution of poll
results.
We focused our attention on an evolution of the well-known CAPTCHA named
ESP-Pix [4]. This test requires the user to recognize a speciﬁc object from a set
of pictures, then select the correct option representing that concept from a drop-
down menu. By introducing this idea in the order-based method, we devised a more
secure protection scheme named picture-based method, which does not suﬀer from
the weaknesses aﬀecting the other solutions.
The new solution shares with the order-based method some features, above all,
it embeds the security mechanism inside the poll, thus allowing a simple and direct
insertion of the poll within portals and web sites. However, in order to properly
integrate the evolved CAPTCHA into the poll page, we should consider that an
Internet poll is a web application with some speciﬁc characteristics:
• it should be easily understandable by voters;
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• the voting procedure should be quick and clear to learn and should not take more
than few second to be brought to a conclusion;
• it should occupy a little portion of the screen;
• it should “encourage” a web site user to spend some time reading the poll and
voting for it.
Considering all these constraints, we opted for a drag-and-drop approach: voters
have to drag the desired choice, expressed in form of text, and drop it on the box
with the picture suggested from the poll. This requires the user to recognize from
two diﬀerent pictures, chosen properly from a database, both representing a speciﬁc
concept. When the user drops a choice on the indicated image, a vote related to that
choice is submitted and correctly counted. Otherwise, a new test (with diﬀerent
images) is presented to the voter. If a voter fails the test for more than two times, he
or she is prevented from accessing the poll page again. This is possible by locking
his or her IP address for a variable amount of time. The locking time increases
with the number of subsequent failed attempts of voting, until a maximum value is
reached.
In ﬁgure 1 is shown an example of the explained method. Note that the picture-
(a) poll page (b) voting for Italian cuisine
Fig. 1. Examples of the picture-based method
based scheme contains a CAPTCHA which is easier to solve if compared to the
ESP-Pix. Indeed, the correct category is not listed within a drop-down menu,
but it is clearly indicated by the test itself, thus improving the usability of the
CAPTCHA.
Being a visual-CAPTCHA, it inherits an issue typical of these tests: it poses
problems for blind and visually impaired people and, in general, for those users
who have cognitive and learning disability [10]. Due to this reason, the picture-
based method has to be integrated by means of an audio CAPTCHA [9], which
is, on the contrary, a suitable alternative in these speciﬁc circumstances. However,
an approach to security of Internet polls exclusively based on such a test is not
recommended, since the diﬃculty of undertaking the test would be too high and
the level of accessibility of the poll considerably low.
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4 Properties of the proposed method
As correctly stated in [3], an Internet poll is fair and secure against massive falsi-
ﬁcations if:
(i) Internet users are always allowed to participate in the poll, without any re-
striction due to protection schemes based on IP address ﬁltering or other dis-
criminating parameter which is not unique for each user;
(ii) programming a bot for massive falsiﬁcation is a diﬃcult and time-consuming
task to achieve.
Therefore, we must obviously rule out any protection technique based on the IP
locking scheme and the cookie-based method. Regarding the picture-based method,
we can claim that it satisﬁes both the above requisites, due to its security properties,
described below.
Fairness
The proposed scheme can be considered fair in the sense that it does not prevent
any human user from participating to the poll, even if multiple voters share the
same IP address. Indeed, every voting session is separate from the others so that
two or more users can vote to the same poll, at the same time, even using the same
workstation. The only exception is the IP address locking which happens when a
voter repeatedly fails the test. In that speciﬁc case, if diﬀerent voters share the
same IP address of the possible attacker, they are prevented from accessing the
poll. Moreover, the suggested scheme can be considered fair even towards visually
impaired people, since it allows the voters to switch to an audio security challenge.
Classiﬁcation resistance
We claim that the proposed protection scheme is classiﬁcation resistant since it is
able to prevent automatic pictures recognition by means of classiﬁcation of all im-
ages stored in our database. We achieve this goal by using the following techniques:
• Pictures are extracted from a database that contains a very large number of dif-
ferent images belonging to a considerably high number of categories. Thus, the
probability to get the same picture twice is low, making the automatic classiﬁca-
tion of the database content much harder to achieve. Regarding the creation of
the database, possible approaches are shown in [7].
• The system applies a number of transformations on every selected image, such
as resizing it by a random percentage of the original size, rotating it by a ran-
domly chosen angle or ﬂipping it on its vertical axis. More complex operations
like random distortion can also be applied, in order to make harder performing
image comparisons by means of boundary detection. Furthermore, the system
dynamically modiﬁes the shade of a number of pixels with a randomly chosen
percentage of its original color, in order to increase the diﬃculty of performing
an attack based on colors recognition.
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• Multiple categories are associated to a single picture, rather than only one. This
way, if we ask a user to recognize the picture representing a feline, we can provide
an image with either a tiger or a cat. The algorithm for selecting categories
and pictures is based on the simple idea that, given an image a belonging to the
category c, a second image b will be chosen from a category that has no pictures
in common with c. With this scheme, there is no chance that the user might be
asked to recognize an object that is displayed in both two pictures.
• The system uses the pool of category technique for improving classiﬁcation resis-
tance of the pictures database. With this term, we refer to a method for limiting
the number of categories (and related images) that a single IP address can access.
The idea is to create a subset of all categories, called pool, and associate it to a
speciﬁc IP address. Each request for a poll page from that address would result
in returning two images randomly chosen from two of the pool’s categories. This
way, a single IP address is bound to a ﬁxed subset of categories until a valid vote
is cast. Then, a new pool is created in function of the voter IP address and the
number of valid votes (from that IP address). This technique thwarts both the
manual and automatic classiﬁcation process, since, each time a correct vote is
casted, the classiﬁcation task must be repeated.
Robustness
In order to be considered robust, the picture-based method must be able to stop
automatic voting programs from modifying the result of a poll through proper
attacks. From our tests and the Internet open challenge proposed in section 5, we
have been able to detect two possible types of attacks. They are described below,
along with the countermeasures used to prevent them from being successful:
• blind-voting attack, which executes repeated attempts to vote by subsequently
dragging the chosen option on the ﬁrst of the two pictures. Repeating this voting
procedure for n times would allow the attacker to successfully cast an average
of n/2 votes and fail the other half. All these wrong votes would lead to an
increasing temporary lock of the attacker’s IP address, making the blind-voting
attack too slow and not eﬀective in massively altering the results of a poll.
• similarity-based attack, which tries to guess the correct binding between the in-
dicated category and one of the displayed pictures by exploiting visual image
similarities. The attack is a two-step procedure: in the ﬁrst one, the bot builds
up a repertoire of reference images for each category, retrieving several pictures
from the poll page, which are then categorized by a human being. The second step
is the real attack and works by repeatedly comparing the two candidate images
against previous instances of pictures that ﬁt the category indicated in the poll.
If a match is found, that image is used as the guess and a vote is attempted. In
case the vote is unsuccessful, the other image is added to the collection associated
with the category and the process restarts.
The proposed protection method can be considered robust also against attacks
based on images similarities due to the usage of the “pool of categories” technique,
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which forces a new classiﬁcation phase each time a vote is correctly casted.
As a last consideration, note that the proposed method still allows multiple votes
being manually cast from a human voter. Although this behavior might be consid-
ered inadequate under some circumstances, it does not aﬀects the security of the
protection scheme. Considering all the above premises, we can thus state that the
proposed security method is highly resistant against automatic attacks.
5 Tests and results
In order to verify the correctness of our proposed solution, we developed a prototype
implementing the main idea and its security properties. We then performed a series
of tests by simulating the usual behavior of a voting bot implementing both the
blind-voting attack and the similarity-based attack. We also set up a wider test
through an Internet open challenge 4 .
The test session on the blind-voting attack has been conducted by implementing
a simple bot which is able to vote automatically by repeatedly selecting the same
voting option and dragging it always to the ﬁrst picture. The attack lasted for 72
hours and the total number of correct and wrong votes was recorded. By plotting
those data on a graphic, we can analyze the distribution of votes when the picture-
based scheme is used to protect the poll. As we can observe from ﬁgure 2(a), a total
number of 113 votes was attempted (continuous line) and only 45 can be counted as
eﬀective increment of the poll results (square-marked line). The other 68 attempts
are wrong (cross-hatched line) and led to a temporary locks of the bot’s IP address.
Since it has not being able to massively modify the ﬁnal result of a poll in a relatively
long period of time, the blind-voting attack cannot be considered successful.
The second series of tests was performed on the similarity-based attack. How-
ever, in this simulation, we decided to disable the “pool of categories” protection,
in order to simplify the attack. Then, we ran a bot to automatically download 100
images from the poll and we manually classiﬁed them. With this small subset of
pictures, we started the bot implementing the similarity-based attack, which tried
to vote for several hours. The ﬁnal results of the simulation are shown in ﬁgure
2(b). As we can observe from the graphic, a total number of 253 votes (continuous
line) has been attempted, while the total number of accesses to the poll is 4221
(cross-hatched line). This fact clearly shows that the bot tried to vote only the 6%
of times, that is only when the images were rather similar. However, for 240 times
the vote was counted positively, with only 13 errors (square-marked line) which
temporarily locked the bot’s IP address.
In this second simulation, the bot was more eﬀective compared to the blind-
voting attack. However, in a real situation, with the “pool of categories” protection
enabled, a human intervention for manually categorize an average of 100 pictures
would be required for 240 times, one for each correctly cast vote. It is therefore
reasonable to state that it is undoubtedly more convenient to vote manually for 240
4 http://secg.di.unito.it/ipollchallenge/
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(a) blind-voting attack (b) similarity-based attack
Fig. 2. Tests
times than attempting an automatic, similarity-based attack.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we presented the picture-based scheme, a new solution for preventing
automatic and massive alteration of Internet polls results, developed to address
security issues arose with an existing protection method. The novelty of this solution
is the direct embedding of the CAPTCHA-based protection inside the poll page,
whilst its security aspects rely on the inability of modern computer to correctly
recognize concepts expressed by pictures and sounds contained into audio streams.
It can be deﬁned as (1) fair, since it does not discriminate users, (2) robust, due
to its strong CAPTCHA properties and (3) resistant to classiﬁcation of all pictures
constituting its database. In addition, the proposed scheme allows a simple and
immediate integration of the poll inside Internet portals and web pages, which is a
feature particularly important for granting high visibility and accessibility to online
surveys.
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